Changes touching this path

• repo_member gets the producer it has never had and it is the site's: migration 0013 creates forge_member_writer holding SELECT, INSERT and DELETE on repo_member plus SELECT on account_key and repo and nothing else, named writer rather than forge_member because ADR 0077 reserves that name for #1726's read role - and a test enforces the reservation. The load-bearing half is that membership is addressed by pubkey and STORED BY ACCOUNT: the owner names a collaborator pubkey, the server resolves it through account_key to a tenant_id, and storing the key instead would silently un-member anyone who rotated, which ADR 0016 makes an account fact and #927 already taught the push path. That resolution deliberately ignores retired_at, proved by adding the filter and watching a rotation test refuse a member who had merely rotated. The site module is a SIBLING of identity, read and owner rather than a widening of any of them, and the route reuses withOwnedRepo for authorization while every membership statement ALSO joins repo on owner_pubkey, so the database refuses a stranger independently of the route - proved by dropping that clause and watching a stranger's repo really take the row. Thirteen guards were each broken and read before being restored, and the one worth naming is the column-ACL half: a live GRANT UPDATE (tenant_id) ON repo_member PASSES the set equality and is caught only by the column check, because has_table_privilege cannot see a column-scoped grant, and its positive control revokes 0007's own column grant to prove the query can see one at all. The accountless refusal is its own sentence rather than a foreign-key error because a keypair is free and infinitely mintable, so an accountless member can be neither quota'd nor banned; and the honest-revoke copy interpolates MAX_PRESIGN_SECONDS from read/blob.ts so it cannot drift from the sixty-second window it admits is small and not zero. account_tier.rs's assertion is untouched and passes unamended, which is what ADR 0077 predicted - what needed repointing was #1639's own replacement header, true when written and false on landing. ADR 0059's count of the site's Postgres URLs was a live count, is now four, and is named rather than counted. Membership is write-only until #1726 and #1728 give it a reader, and provisioning is a different repo, so the route throws until scripts gives the role LOGIN (#1730) (#1725) 4fac0c99 · dbf3dbe6…
• RLS arrives on the trigger #702 named rather than on a schedule, because #1725 made it fire the same night: forge_member_writer holds SELECT, INSERT and DELETE on repo_member and SELECT on account_key and repo, which are base tables and not views, and its owner-scoping lived entirely in three SQL statements the site writes. It also held a bare unpredicated SELECT on repo, so it could enumerate every namespace on the forge including the metadata-private ones. Migration 0014 enables RLS on eight tables - the schema header's own repo-scoped group plus proposal, which 0011 added to that group after this ticket was written - and the verdict on the forge role is that it is UNCONSTRAINED, said out loud rather than decorated: all eight of its policies are USING (true) WITH CHECK (true), named forge_ingest_is_unconstrained so the catalogue itself prints the admission, because it writes every tenant from one process with no request-scoped identity and a predicate would be either inert or an outage. What ENABLE does buy is exactly this ticket's condition 2, the accident it was deferred against: a role no policy names now reads zero rows, so an ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES that hands a reader every future table is answered by the tables themselves. The per-transaction ingest binding that would make the forge role genuinely constrainable is filed as #1732. FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY was proved rather than assumed, and is deliberately NOT set: on a real cluster a postgres-owned table with RLS enabled AND forced and zero policies still reads 2 of 2 as postgres, where a NOBYPASSRLS role reads 1 of 2 at the same moment, and a non-superuser-owned table reads 2 without FORCE and 0 with it - so the mechanism works, it is inert against a superuser owner, and setting it would be precisely the decorative control this ticket forbids. The red proofs are the output that matters and one of them corrected the method: a policy must be proved by REPLACING its predicate with true, never by dropping the policy, because enabled-with-no-policy is deny-all and returns zero, which proves nothing about the predicate - the first draft did exactly that and it is recorded so the next reader does not repeat it. With the predicate widened instead, the cross-owner INSERT lands and owner B's roster gains a collaborator its owner never named. One thing only a real run could find: membership.pg.test.ts's foreign-key case went red because the policy now stands in FRONT of the constraint, so an unscoped statement never reaches the foreign key the test is about, and left alone it would have quietly become an RLS test named for the wrong mechanism - so it is fixed and the RLS half split into its own case. The site half ships in the same change because it must: membership/db.ts gains withOwner, owner/db.ts's shape minus READ ONLY, and without it 0014 empties the membership surface (#702) c562196e · dbf3dbe6…diff
• the forge live-database suites now run in CI: test-main.yml stands up a postgres:18 service, provisions it the way setup-forge.js does including its default privileges, migrates it with the commit own loot-forge --migrate, sets every LOOT_FORGE_TEST database url the Rust and site suites read, and runs cargo test and then the site pg tests against it. LOOT_FORGE_TEST_REQUIRE_DATABASE turns a database test skip into a failure through pg::live_opt_in and the site skippingLive helper, and with it set and no url 91 Rust tests and all six site pg files fail, while two half-suites that used to skip silently now say so. The default-privilege tripwires run in CI by decision, and fail on a cluster without provisioning. A new migration that neutralises the roster policy passed the bare suite and failed rls.rs and membership.pg.test.ts against the cluster. It is a canary on landed main and not a pre-land gate, and the prose that said no workflow sets these urls now says that instead (#1735) c0931f78 · dbf3dbe6…diff

Renames are not followed. loot's tree maps a path to an address, so a rename is a delete and an add. This list is the history of the name, not of the bytes.