Head

• every compiled-in and current-tense loot host moves to loot.build (map #2412, ADR 0099): loot --help names security@loot.build and https://loot.build/trust, ALPHA_PROMISE_URL is https://loot.build/install and the telemetry DEFAULT_ENDPOINT https://loot.build/api/telemetry, so the next release carries them; the site install one-liners, R2_BASE and HOP_BASE (https://dl.loot.build, https://loot.build/dl), the metrics SITE_SCOPE and own-host referrer, the disclosure links on trust, terms, privacy and known-issues, and the install, quickstart and guides pages follow, with the privacy and terms markers moved to 25 September 2026 and re-pinned since readers see the new address; README, CONTEXT.md (the forge door now forge.loot.build), the release checklist, site CI and test fixtures follow, and the two specs carry a note instead of a partial rewrite. the destination census gains build in WEB_TLDS, without which security@loot.build would be invisible to its bare-host clause, and exempts the two shipped lines that tld makes read as hosts (state.build, r.build()) by their exact text; ADR 0074 section 9 says twelve-entry to match. 37 lines still name millerbyte.com outside ADR bodies, evidence, research and scratch, each kept on purpose: dated history, millerbyte.com the site and its @millerbyte/ui tokens, the two noted specs, and relay-era tooling with no successor host, filed as #2438. census red with build dropped from WEB_TLDS, restored; site gate 819 passed and within budget; workspace suite 4559 passed over 142 binaries, 13 ignored (#2418) c5663115 · handle 85d84d4e

Files

README.md

# loot

A from-scratch source-control system.

**Thesis:** visibility and permissions belong to *content and changes*, not to
the *repository*. Commit your `.env`. Keep files private inside a shared repo.
Embargo a security fix: merge it, cut the release, reveal the source later.

This is the unsolved problem in modern version control. Ergonomics (jj already
nails them) are a layer for later.

## Security

loot's cryptography is written from scratch and has never been independently
reviewed. What each reader — a relay, a forge, a collaborator, the anonymous
internet, the git mirror, and anyone holding your `.loot/` directory — can
actually read is stated tier by tier at
**<https://loot.build/trust>**. Read it before you put anything in a
loot repo whose disclosure would hurt you. Two things it says that the pitch
does not: the default tier is one a relay reads by design, and path names are
never encrypted at any tier.

**Report a vulnerability to <security@loot.build>** — not to the public
Discord. One maintainer, best effort, expect days rather than hours. ⚠ This
file is not the published route: the GitHub repo is permanently private
(ADR 0045/0064), so a `SECURITY.md` here and GitHub's private-advisory button
both reach nobody. `/trust` is the route; this section exists for whoever
already has repo access.

## What works today

The full loop from first init to relay-based collaboration is functional. This
block is the CLI's **full verb list** — all 85 verbs, regenerated from
`loot --help` rather than curated (a guard test pins it to the dispatch table,
so it cannot drift again; #1107):

```text
abandon absorb adopt apply apply-patch archive attest bisect blame bundle buoy
burn cat
cherry-pick clean clone completions config conflicts converge count-objects
describe diff doctor duplicate edit embargo-status evolog explain ferry
fetch format-patch gates gc grant grant-status grants grep heads id init keygen
lane lanes lock log manifest maroon merge migrate move new notes op peer pipeline
propose pull
pull-grants purges push range-diff rehome relay remote resolve restore revert runners seek serve
shortlog show split squash status surface tag telemetry tutorial undo unlock verify
view whoami
```

`loot <verb> --help` prints any verb's own usage block without running it.

### Try it: private `.env` in a shared repo

```bash
cargo build --release
export PATH="$PWD/target/release:$PATH"

cd $(mktemp -d)
printf 'TOKEN=supersecret\n' > .env
printf '# My Project\n'      > README.md
printf '.env restricted=alice\n*.md public\n' > .lootattributes

loot init --identity alice
loot status -m "initial work"
loot surface              # alice: restores both README.md and .env

# switch to a non-keyholder to prove it
printf mallory > .loot/identity
rm -f .env README.md
loot surface              # mallory: README.md appears; .env stays sealed
```

The `.env` ciphertext lives in `.loot/` the whole time. Mallory cannot decrypt
it, and if she snapshots and re-syncs, the sealed file is carried forward
untouched — snapshot is visibility-aware.

### Sync over a relay

A relay stores and forwards ciphertext it cannot read. Restricted keys never
travel in a sync bundle (ADR 0003), so the relay's zero-knowledge property is
enforced at the wire level, not by policy.

```bash
# Terminal 1: run a relay
loot serve --dir /tmp/relay --addr 127.0.0.1:4000

# Terminal 2: alice pushes
loot remote add origin http://127.0.0.1:4000
loot push

# Terminal 3: bob pulls (bob only sees public content)
loot clone http://127.0.0.1:4000 ./bob-repo --identity bob
```

### Grants: sharing a content key

```bash
# alice knows bob's public key (from `loot whoami` on bob's machine)
loot peer add bob "ssh-ed25519 AAAA..."

# deliver a sealed grant via the relay
loot grant --relay origin .env bob

# bob fetches and applies it
loot pull-grants           # verifies alice's signature, checks peer registry
loot surface               # now bob can read .env
```

### Embargo: timed reveals

```bash
# mark a file as embargoed until unix timestamp 1800000000
echo "VULN_DETAILS=CVE-2025-XXXX" > security-fix.txt
printf 'security-fix.txt embargoed=1800000000\n' >> .lootattributes

loot status -m "patch for CVE-2025-XXXX"
loot push                  # relay holds the ciphertext; key withheld until reveal_at
```

At `reveal_at`, the next read promotes the key out of escrow, so anyone who
pulls can read it.
The seam for a third-party key custodian (network escrow) is designed and ready.

## Architecture

```text
crates/
  loot-core       canonical engine: encrypted DAG, per-content visibility, convergence
  loot-identity   ed25519 keypairs, x25519 ECIES, signed push envelopes, peer registry
  loot-net        relay HTTP server + sync client (stow/negotiate/grant mailbox)
  loot-cli        the `loot` binary — commands are thin verbs over Workspace
  loot-bench      shared 50k-file benchmark workload
  spike-dag       thin shim re-exporting loot-core (bake-off compat)
  spike-crdt      non-canonical CRDT model (retained so the bake-off is reproducible)
```

### Key modules

| Module | What it owns |
| --- | --- |
| `loot-core::sealed` | Per-content encryption, key custody, embargo, public-content compression (ADR 0003, 0007, 0020) |
| `loot-core::converge` | Merger/relay convergence rule — decrypt-then-merge (ADR 0001) |
| `loot-core::engine` | Encrypted content-addressed DAG: put/get/record/surface/bundle/apply |
| `loot-core::manifest` | Grant audit trail: grantee, grantor pubkeys, timestamps |
| `loot-identity` | ed25519 sign/verify, x25519 derive, ECIES seal/unseal, push envelope |
| `loot-net::mailbox` | Relay grant mailbox: pubkey-addressed, content-addressed loose blobs |
| `loot-cli::workspace` | Ambient repo: identity, clock, persistence, idempotent snapshot |

### ADRs (docs/adr/)

| # | Decision |
| --- | --- |
| 0001 | Per-content decrypt-then-merge convergence |
| 0002 | Encrypted DAG as the canonical foundation (bake-off winner) |
| 0003 | Sealed content module + keyring custody (restricted keys never travel) |
| 0004 | Drop plaintext dedup equality oracle |
| 0005 | CLI slice, persistence, .lootattributes |
| 0006 | JJ-style workspace auto-snapshot |
| 0007 | Embargo escrow module |
| 0008 | Grant log and targeted key bundles |
| 0009 | Two-level revocation |
| 0010 | Forward-maroon implementation |
| 0011 | Relay stow append-only |
| 0012 | Per-object loose storage |
| 0013 | Named remotes and grant bundle delivery |
| 0014 | Identity keypairs: ed25519 OpenSSH, signed push envelopes |
| 0015 | Grant authentication and trust (grantor signs, peer-registry gate) |
| 0016 | Identity portability: export/import with passphrase wrapping |
| 0017 | RepoStore: one home for the `.loot/` layout |
| 0018 | Signed changes: author in id + validity enforcement |
| 0019 | Format versioning + compatibility gate (newer reads older) |
| 0020 | Compress public content (Zstd); format major → 2 |
| 0021 | Object-level "wants" negotiation on push/pull |
| 0022 | Concurrent-agent model: docks, harbor, optimistic convergence |
| 0023 | Agent-facing machine output: porcelain-first, reconciliation verbs |
| 0024 | Resumable transfer via batched, negotiated sync |

See [CONTEXT.md](CONTEXT.md) for the full domain glossary.

## Build & test

```bash
cargo build
cargo test          # ~25s — includes HTTP relay integration tests
cargo test -p loot-core   # fast, no I/O, 67 tests
```

## Command reference

```text
loot init [--identity <name>]             initialize a repo (identity from global config if omitted)
loot clone <url> <dir>                    clone a relay or forge repo into <dir>; ends with a materialized working tree
loot config [--local] set <key> <val>    set a config value; bare writes the global file (~/.config/loot/config), --local writes this repo's (.loot/config.local, never tracked)
loot config --get <key>                  print one effective value (local over global); exits non-zero when unset
loot status [-m <message>]               snapshot the working tree into the working change (idempotent)
loot describe -m <message>               name the working change
loot new                                 finalize the working change; start a fresh one
loot surface                             materialize what the current identity may see
loot lane new [--name <n>]               spawn a sealed lane (isolated tree + tip) over the shared store
loot lanes                               list lanes with their tip, in-flight PR, and status
loot log                                 show change history with visibility hints
loot gc [--dry-run]                      prune loose objects no change references
loot verify [--accept-loss] [--unreachable]  integrity-check the object store (exits 1 on corrupt/missing; --accept-loss records unrecoverable losses; --unreachable also lists objects that are PRESENT and referenced by nothing — deletes nothing, names `loot gc` as the remedy, and never changes the exit status)
loot bundle <file>                       write a sync bundle (ciphertext, no keys)
loot apply <file>                        merge a peer's bundle (idempotent)
loot apply-patch <file> [--check]        apply a TEXT patch `loot format-patch` wrote — strict, with an ADR 0044 three-way fallback that stops on conflict like `loot apply` does; a path this identity cannot open refuses the whole run, and CRLF is refused where the patch says it lost line endings or would rewrite a CRLF file (ADR 0082). --check reports applicability and writes nothing
loot grant <path> <identity> <file>      write a targeted grant bundle (file delivery)
loot grant --relay <remote> <path> <id>  seal and deliver a grant via relay mailbox
loot grants [<url>]                      peek pending grant count (no download)
loot pull-grants [<url>]                 fetch, verify, and apply sealed grants from relay
loot maroon [--hard] <path> <identity>   cut off <identity> from future access
loot migrate <path> <vis-spec>           change a path's visibility
loot manifest                            show the grant audit trail (and attestations)
loot conflicts                           list paths needing resolution
loot resolve <path> <file>               resolve a conflict
loot remote add <name> <url>             register a relay URL
loot push [<url>]                        publish changes to a relay
loot pull [<url>]                        fetch and merge changes from a relay
loot fetch [<url>]                       ingest from a relay and stop — no merge, no converge, no tree write
loot serve [--addr <host:port>]          run a relay
loot keygen                              generate an identity keypair
loot whoami                              show identity and public key
loot id export <file>                    export keypair, passphrase-encrypted
loot id import <file>                    import keypair from passphrase-encrypted file
loot peer add <name> <pubkey>            register a peer's public key
loot peer list                           list known peers
```