Diff of README.md · loot

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 # loot
 A from-scratch source-control system.
 **Thesis:** visibility and permissions belong to *content and changes*, not to
 the *repository*. Commit your `.env`. Keep files private inside a shared repo.
 Embargo a security fix: merge it, cut the release, reveal the source later.
 This is the unsolved problem in modern version control. Ergonomics (jj already
 nails them) are a layer for later.
 ## Security
 loot's cryptography is written from scratch and has never been independently
 reviewed. What each reader — a relay, a forge, a collaborator, the anonymous
 internet, the git mirror, and anyone holding your `.loot/` directory — can
 actually read is stated tier by tier at
 **<https://loot.millerbyte.com/trust>**. Read it before you put anything in a
 loot repo whose disclosure would hurt you. Two things it says that the pitch
 does not: the default tier is one a relay reads by design, and path names are
 never encrypted at any tier.
 **Report a vulnerability to <security@millerbyte.com>** — not to the public
 Discord. One maintainer, best effort, expect days rather than hours. ⚠ This
 file is not the published route: the GitHub repo is permanently private
 (ADR 0045/0064), so a `SECURITY.md` here and GitHub's private-advisory button
 both reach nobody. `/trust` is the route; this section exists for whoever
 already has repo access.
 ## What works today
 The full loop from first init to relay-based collaboration is functional. This
-−
+block is the CLI's **full verb list** — all 71 verbs, regenerated from
 block is the CLI's **full verb list** — all 72 verbs, regenerated from
 `loot --help` rather than curated (a guard test pins it to the dispatch table,
 so it cannot drift again; #1107):
 ```text
 abandon absorb adopt apply archive attest bisect blame bundle buoy burn cat
 cherry-pick clone completions config conflicts converge describe diff doctor
 duplicate edit embargo-status evolog explain ferry gates gc grant grant-status
 grants grep heads id init keygen lane lanes lock log manifest maroon migrate
-−
+new op peer pull pull-grants purges push rehome relay remote resolve restore
-−
+revert serve shortlog show split squash status surface tag tutorial undo
-−
+unlock verify view whoami
 new op peer propose pull pull-grants purges push rehome relay remote resolve
 restore revert serve shortlog show split squash status surface tag tutorial
 undo unlock verify view whoami
 ```
 `loot <verb> --help` prints any verb's own usage block without running it.
 ### Try it: private `.env` in a shared repo
 ```bash
 cargo build --release
 export PATH="$PWD/target/release:$PATH"
 cd $(mktemp -d)
 printf 'TOKEN=supersecret\n' > .env
 printf '# My Project\n'      > README.md
 printf '.env restricted=alice\n*.md public\n' > .lootattributes
 loot init --identity alice
 loot status -m "initial work"
 loot surface              # alice: restores both README.md and .env
 # switch to a non-keyholder to prove it
 printf mallory > .loot/identity
 rm -f .env README.md
 loot surface              # mallory: README.md appears; .env stays sealed
 ```
 The `.env` ciphertext lives in `.loot/` the whole time. Mallory cannot decrypt
 it, and if she snapshots and re-syncs, the sealed file is carried forward
 untouched — snapshot is visibility-aware.
 ### Sync over a relay
 A relay stores and forwards ciphertext it cannot read. Restricted keys never
 travel in a sync bundle (ADR 0003), so the relay's zero-knowledge property is
 enforced at the wire level, not by policy.
 ```bash
 # Terminal 1: run a relay
 loot serve --dir /tmp/relay --addr 127.0.0.1:4000
 # Terminal 2: alice pushes
 loot remote add origin http://127.0.0.1:4000
 loot push
 # Terminal 3: bob pulls (bob only sees public content)
 loot clone http://127.0.0.1:4000 ./bob-repo --identity bob
 ```
 ### Grants: sharing a content key
 ```bash
 # alice knows bob's public key (from `loot whoami` on bob's machine)
 loot peer add bob "ssh-ed25519 AAAA..."
 # deliver a sealed grant via the relay
 loot grant --relay origin .env bob
 # bob fetches and applies it
 loot pull-grants           # verifies alice's signature, checks peer registry
 loot surface               # now bob can read .env
 ```
 ### Embargo: timed reveals
 ```bash
 # mark a file as embargoed until unix timestamp 1800000000
 echo "VULN_DETAILS=CVE-2025-XXXX" > security-fix.txt
 printf 'security-fix.txt embargoed=1800000000\n' >> .lootattributes
 loot status -m "patch for CVE-2025-XXXX"
 loot push                  # relay holds the ciphertext; key withheld until reveal_at
 ```
 At `reveal_at`, the next read promotes the key out of escrow, so anyone who
 pulls can read it.
 The seam for a third-party key custodian (network escrow) is designed and ready.
 ## Architecture
 ```text
 crates/
   loot-core       canonical engine: encrypted DAG, per-content visibility, convergence
   loot-identity   ed25519 keypairs, x25519 ECIES, signed push envelopes, peer registry
   loot-net        relay HTTP server + sync client (stow/negotiate/grant mailbox)
   loot-cli        the `loot` binary — commands are thin verbs over Workspace
   loot-bench      shared 50k-file benchmark workload
   spike-dag       thin shim re-exporting loot-core (bake-off compat)
   spike-crdt      non-canonical CRDT model (retained so the bake-off is reproducible)
 ```
 ### Key modules
 | Module | What it owns |
 | --- | --- |
 | `loot-core::sealed` | Per-content encryption, key custody, embargo, public-content compression (ADR 0003, 0007, 0020) |
 | `loot-core::converge` | Merger/relay convergence rule — decrypt-then-merge (ADR 0001) |
 | `loot-core::engine` | Encrypted content-addressed DAG: put/get/record/surface/bundle/apply |
 | `loot-core::manifest` | Grant audit trail: grantee, grantor pubkeys, timestamps |
 | `loot-identity` | ed25519 sign/verify, x25519 derive, ECIES seal/unseal, push envelope |
 | `loot-net::mailbox` | Relay grant mailbox: pubkey-addressed, content-addressed loose blobs |
 | `loot-cli::workspace` | Ambient repo: identity, clock, persistence, idempotent snapshot |
 ### ADRs (docs/adr/)
 | # | Decision |
 | --- | --- |
 | 0001 | Per-content decrypt-then-merge convergence |
 | 0002 | Encrypted DAG as the canonical foundation (bake-off winner) |
 | 0003 | Sealed content module + keyring custody (restricted keys never travel) |
 | 0004 | Drop plaintext dedup equality oracle |
 | 0005 | CLI slice, persistence, .lootattributes |
 | 0006 | JJ-style workspace auto-snapshot |
 | 0007 | Embargo escrow module |
 | 0008 | Grant log and targeted key bundles |
 | 0009 | Two-level revocation |
 | 0010 | Forward-maroon implementation |
 | 0011 | Relay stow append-only |
 | 0012 | Per-object loose storage |
 | 0013 | Named remotes and grant bundle delivery |
 | 0014 | Identity keypairs: ed25519 OpenSSH, signed push envelopes |
 | 0015 | Grant authentication and trust (grantor signs, peer-registry gate) |
 | 0016 | Identity portability: export/import with passphrase wrapping |
 | 0017 | RepoStore: one home for the `.loot/` layout |
 | 0018 | Signed changes: author in id + validity enforcement |
 | 0019 | Format versioning + compatibility gate (newer reads older) |
 | 0020 | Compress public content (Zstd); format major → 2 |
 | 0021 | Object-level "wants" negotiation on push/pull |
 | 0022 | Concurrent-agent model: docks, harbor, optimistic convergence |
 | 0023 | Agent-facing machine output: porcelain-first, reconciliation verbs |
 | 0024 | Resumable transfer via batched, negotiated sync |
 See [CONTEXT.md](CONTEXT.md) for the full domain glossary.
 ## Build & test
 ```bash
 cargo build
 cargo test          # ~25s — includes HTTP relay integration tests
 cargo test -p loot-core   # fast, no I/O, 67 tests
 ```
 ## Command reference
 ```text
 loot init [--identity <name>]             initialize a repo (identity from global config if omitted)
 loot clone <url> <dir>                    clone a relay or forge repo into <dir>; ends with a materialized working tree
 loot config set <key> <val>              set a global config value (~/.config/loot/config)
 loot status [-m <message>]               snapshot the working tree into the working change (idempotent)
 loot describe -m <message>               name the working change
 loot new                                 finalize the working change; start a fresh one
 loot surface                             materialize what the current identity may see
 loot lane new [--name <n>]               spawn a sealed lane (isolated tree + tip) over the shared store
 loot lanes                               list lanes with their tip, in-flight PR, and status
 loot log                                 show change history with visibility hints
 loot gc [--dry-run]                      prune loose objects no change references
 loot verify [--accept-loss]              integrity-check the object store (exits 1 on corrupt/missing; --accept-loss records unrecoverable losses)
 loot bundle <file>                       write a sync bundle (ciphertext, no keys)
 loot apply <file>                        merge a peer's bundle (idempotent)
 loot grant <path> <identity> <file>      write a targeted grant bundle (file delivery)
 loot grant --relay <remote> <path> <id>  seal and deliver a grant via relay mailbox
 loot grants [<url>]                      peek pending grant count (no download)
 loot pull-grants [<url>]                 fetch, verify, and apply sealed grants from relay
 loot maroon [--hard] <path> <identity>   cut off <identity> from future access
 loot migrate <path> <vis-spec>           change a path's visibility
 loot manifest                            show the grant audit trail
 loot conflicts                           list paths needing resolution
 loot resolve <path> <file>               resolve a conflict
 loot remote add <name> <url>             register a relay URL
 loot push [<url>]                        publish changes to a relay
 loot pull [<url>]                        fetch and merge changes from a relay
 loot serve [--addr <host:port>]          run a relay
 loot keygen                              generate an identity keypair
 loot whoami                              show identity and public key
 loot id export <file>                    export keypair, passphrase-encrypted
 loot id import <file>                    import keypair from passphrase-encrypted file
 loot peer add <name> <pubkey>            register a peer's public key
 loot peer list                           list known peers
 ```